RECENT CASES
BANKS AND BANKING.
An action was brought by an original creditor against the
debtor. Defendant, the debtor, had agreed to send, and did
send a check covering the amount of his indebtedDelay In
Preseting
ness to plaintiff's attorney. The latter, instead of
Check
presenting the note for payment, indorsed and negotiated it. Two days later the bank on which the check was
drawn failed, and plaintiff sued on the original debt. The defence was that by plaintiff's action in not presenting the check,
defendant was relieved of liability; and the Court held that the
original debt was not revived by reason of the attorney's nonpresentment of the check. "Delay in presentment of a check
will relieve the drawer of liability, where he has been injured
by the delay. Kramerv. Grant, i II N. Y. Supp. 209. This principle thus stated by the Court has been well settled by a long
line of decisions (Murphy v. Levy, 23 Misc. Rep. 147; Carroll
v. Sweet, 128 N. Y. i).
BILLS AND NOTES.
In the case of Smith Louis Gin and Machine Co. v. Badham
(South Carolina), 61 S. E. 1031, the instrument contained
Additional

Promis as

a "promise to pay to the order of V. C. Badham

$76o.66 negotiable and payable at the bank in D
without offset with interest ***

Neotilty

with all ex-

penses, if suit be instituted for collection of this

note."
The decision holding the note non-negotiable, was based
upon the prior mercantile law decisions of South Carolina, that
State not having adopted the "Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Law."
Prior to the Negotiable Instruments Law the question has
arisen in numerous jurisdictions, some of which had adopted
the same ruling as the principal case. Overton v. Tyler, 3 Barr.
346 (costs of collection); Woods v. North, 84 Pa. St. 407;
Pace v. Gilbert School, 118 Mo. App. 369 (attorney's fees for
collection) while others had held the paper to be negotiable
notwithstanding the promise to pay additional expenses. Adams
v. Addington, 16 Fed. 89 (attorney's fees for collection) ;Dumas
(112)
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* BILLS AND NOTES (Continued).
v. People's Bank (Ala.), 40 So. 964 (costs of collection and
attorney's fees); Stapleton v. Louisville Banking Co., 95 Ga.
802 ("all costs and io per cent. on amount for counsel fees,
if placed in the hands of an attorney for suit").
A bank allowed a lumber company, in which A was interested, to overdraw its account. To meet these overdrafts A
made notes payable to the order of the lumber
Bonn Fide
Purchaser
Blank Notes

company. When the cashier of the bank received
them they were blank as to date, time of payment,

and amount. He filled in the blanks as occasion required, the
lumber company endorsed the notes and the bank placed the
proceeds to the credit of the company. After maturity the
notes were transferred to the plaintiff, who seeks recovery on
the ground that the bank was a bona fide holder, and that therefore he is entitled to be so considered.
Held, that under the Negotiable Instruments Law, providing
that one can be a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument only where "it is complete and regular on its face"
(Sec. 52, i N. Y. Laws 1897, p. 719, c 612), the bank was not
a bona fide holder. Hunter v. Bacon, iii N. Y. Sup. 82o.
This case is interesting as being one of the first judicial interpretations of Sec. 52, i of the Negotiable Instruments Law
(Elias v. Whitney, 98 N. Y. Sup. 667; Trustees of Bk. v. McComb, 54 S. E. 14). Under the above interpretation the section
accords with the Law Merchant as it existed in New York
prior to the passage of the Negotiable Instruments Law. (See,
Davis Sewing Machine Co. v. Best, 1O5 N. Y. 50; Ledwich v.
McKim, 53 N. Y. 307.)
CONTRACT.
Defendants, real estate agents, made agreement with plaintiff
for his services in negotiating for the sale of certain lands in the
Conslderstion
-Bona Fide
DisputescoWp1-Ofse

hands of defendants. Parties disagree as to what
the terms of the original agreement were and defendant contends that there was a compromise.
Held, instruction was error. Compromise of a bona

fide dispute as to a claim is itself a good consideration without
reference to the original controversy. Kelly v. Hopkins, 117
N. W. 396. (Cf. Newberry et al. v. Chicago Lumbering Co.,
117

N. 'W. 592.)

The above doctrine is the prevailing one, and upon examina-
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tion will be found to be sound, although some courts maintain
a contrary rule, on the ground that such a compromise is no
consideration for the new agreement, unless it subsequently
appear that the disputed claim was in fact a valid one. (Fink
v. Smith, 17o Pa. 124.) But this proposition is too narrow and
is advanced only by reason of a mistaken view of what the
consideration is in such compromise agreements. Every individual has an absolute right to bring suit whenever he believes that he has a good cause of action. In compromise agreements it is a detriment to give up the right to bring suit, although that right may not have involved a valid right of action (Callisher v. Bischoffsheim, L. R. 5 Q. B. 449). Therefore the existence of such a detriment is determined not by the
validity of the right of action, but by the honesty of belief in
it, as it is on the latter that the right to bring suit depends. It
is that detriment (which also involves the benefit to the other
party of not having to defend the suit, whether well founded
or not) which constitutes a good consideration for compromise
agreements. Accord: Demars v. Land Co., 37 Minn. 418;
Grandin v. Grandin,49 N. J. L. 508; Connecticut River Lumber Co. v. Brown, 68 Vt. 239.
In an action on an agreement, executed by one to his mother
and sister to pay them an annuity, which recited, "for value
Cosldamtflon
rnovlnjfzrom
Thifrd

received, I hereby promise to pay," the defendant admitted the receipt of large sums of money

from his father, at whose request he made the

agreement.
Held, (i) that the words "for value received" imported a
sufficient consideration to sustain the action in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, and (2) that as the promise was made
directly to the plaintiff; she could enforce it though the consideration moved from the father. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 112
N. Y. Sup. io.
(i) The doctrine that the words "for value received" in a
written contract are prima facie evidence of a sufficient consideration is well established in the United States. (See Rice v.
Rice, 6o N. Y. Sup. 97; Jones v. Holliday, ii Tex. 412; Thrall
v. Newell, 19 Vt. 202.)
(2) The English rule laid down in Tweddle v. Atkinson,
I B. & S. 398, that "no stranger to the consideration can take
advantage of a contract though made for his benefit," is not
followed in the great majority of American jurisdictions where
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it is held that if the promise is made directly to the plaintiA
he may recover upon it though the consideration moved from
another. Rector v. Teed, 12o N. Y. 583; First Nat. Bk. v.
Chahners, 144 N. Y. 432; Palmer Sa'. Bk. v. Ins. Co., 166
Mass. 189; Van Eman v. Stanchfield, IO Minn. 255.
For a discussion of the conflicting doctrines where the
promise is not made directly to the plaintiff see Lawrence v.
Fox, 20 N. Y. 268; 15 Harv. Law Rev. 767; Anson Contracts
(2nd Am. ed. 1907) p. 282.
As the promise in our principle case was made to the plaintiff the decision, while in conflict with the English doctrine, is
supported by the great weight of American authority.
Plaintiff by interviewing mayor, soliciting members of Councils, arranging meetings of committees and speaking before
them, succeeded after several years in effecting a
Contract
for
sale of the Bienville Water Supply Company's
L bbyir,
N~~nfor.eproperty to the city.
ble as Against
Public Policy
Plaintiff alleges that said services were rendered
under a contract with defendant, and seeks to
recover for them. Held, Councils is the legislative body of a
city. The contract was for lobby services and, as such, is void
as against public policy. Burke v. Wood, 192 Fed. 533.
Persons whose rights will be affected by proceedings of the
legislature, have an undoubted right to urge their arguments
before that body, personally or through counsel, and contracts
for such services are free from judicial criticism. Miles v.
Thorne, 38 Cal. 335, 339. But when such services consist of
personal solicitations of the members of a legislative body, for
the purpose of unduly controlling legislation otherwise than
by appealing to the legislators' reason, they become what is
commonly called lobbying. Trist v. Child, 21 Wall, 441. Some
courts go so far as to hold all contracts for lobbying void
on the ground that they tend to encourage corrupt and underhand methods, whether such appear to have been employed or
not. Mills v. Mills, 40 N. Y. 543; Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, 5 W;
& S. 315. A less strict rule is that they are void only when it
appears that they contemplated indirect methods, or that such
were actually exercised. And so many courts hold that any
provision in the nature of a contingent fee avoids the contract,
as being likely to lead to indirect methods. Critchfield v. Bermudez Paving Co., 174 IIl. 466, 478. The same is true as to
any secrecy or concealment as to the relation between the party
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rendering and the party paying for such services. Marshall v.
B. & 0. R. R. Co., 16 How. 314, 334.
The above rules do not conflict in principle as all are based
on the proposition that contracts for influencing legislators,
otherwise than by appealing to their reason are against public
policy. They vary only in what they consider to be sufficient
indication of such influence, to render a contract unenforceable.
Defendant, having made a note to plaintiff's agent, for the
purchase price of two mules, contracted to pay off the note by
cultivating certain land, and paying plaintiff's
I-Sbilty
f ertrmagent a share of the proceeds. Defendant pleads
ance
act of God, and impossiblity of performance owing
to the swampy nature of the land, and the continuous and successive rains. Held, when a party voluntarily undertakes, and
by contract binds himself to do an act or thing without qualification, and the performance thereof becomes impossible by
some contingency which should have been anticipated and
provided against in the contract, and such provision is not
made, the non-performance will not be excused. Gunter v.
Robinson, 112 S. W. Rep. 134 (Texas).
This decision falls under the doctrine, now well recognized,
which was first clearly stated in the English case of Paradine
v. Jane, Aleyn 26, where the Court held that where the law
creates a duty or a charge, and the party is disabled to perform it without any default in him, there the law will excuse
him; but where the party by his own contract creates a duty
or charge upon himself, he is bound to make it good, notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessity, because he might
have provided against it by his contract. The case of McGhee
v. Hill, 4 Port. (Ala.) i7o, is practically a counterpart of this
case of Gunter v. Robinson, for there it was held that the defendant was not excused from delivering a specified amount
of corn, because of an unusual drought. See also Eugster v.
West, 35 La. Ann. 119, and 9 Cyc. 627. Anson, in his latest
edition, at page 396 et seq., declares the rule as stated above
to be the correct rule of law subject to three exceptions which
relieve from liability: (i) where the law is changed subsequent
to the contract; (2) where there is a destruction of the subject matter; (3) in the case of incapacity for personal service.
The decision in the case under discussion, not falling within any
of these exceptions, is therefore supported by the leading
authorities, both English and American.
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Defendant promised plaintiff that if the latter would marry
defendant's daughter he would give him $2ooo. All of this
amount was paid except $ioo for which defendant
Consideration
gave a note, and this suit is brought to recover that
sum. Held, marriage is a good and sufficient conideration for a promise to pay money, and this is not such
a contract as is invalid for reasons of public policy. Lieb v.
Dobriner,iii N. Y. Supp. 650.
The report of the case leaves us in doubt whether at the
time the promise was made the plaintiff was already engaged
to marry the defendant's daughter, or whether the engagement
was subsequent. If the engagement had already been entered
into, it would be against the New York doctrine to hold that
there was any consideration. This point was squarely decided
in Gerlach v. Steinke, 22 Alb. L. J. 134, where it was held that
since there was a pre-existing legal liability on the part of the
plaintiff to marry the woman, there was no consideration to the
defendant. This is of course contrary to the familiar English
case of Shadwell v. Shadwell, 30 L. J. Rep. C. P. 145, where
a recovery was allowed under such circumstances. The doctrine of Gerlach v. Steinke is to-day considered more consistent
with the principles of consideration. The New York court
in this case of Lieb v. Dobrinerbase their decision on the New
York cases of Wright v. Wright, 54 N. Y. 437, and Peck v.
Vandermark, 99 N. Y. 30, neither of which cases is a direct
authority, since in each there is an additional element of consideration besides the marriage, and also the contracts are made
directly between the man and woman, and in contemplation of
their own marriage. But the case of Chichester's Exec'x v.
Vass's Adm'r, i Munf. (Va.) 198, is decided upon almost
identical facts with those of the present case, and recovery is
allowed. All of these cases must, however, be distinguished
from the so-called marriage brokerage contracts which public
policy has required to be considered invalid, as for instance, the
case of Duval v. Wellman, 124 N. Y. 156.
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CONTRACTS.
Defendant and his associates were considering four possible
routes for a railroad to be built by a company that they were
about to incorporate. Defendant agreed to adopt
Public Pois
Agreements
one of said routes in consideration of plaintiffs
giving him an option upon certain lumber lands
Routes
along tlfat route, in disposing of which defendant
could obtain freight to be carried. Held, this contract is in
effect between a railroad company and an outside individual.
It violates no rule of public policy and is not void. McCowen v.
Pew, 86 Pac. 893.
A railroad company is a quasi-public corporation and therefore owes a high duty to the public in selecting routes. But
since it is only quasi-public, it owes a financial duty to its stockholders, as well as one of efficiency to the public, and it is therefore legitimate for a railroad company to enter into agreements fixing proposed routes for considerations consisting of
money or real estate (Louisville, etc., Co. v. Summer, io6 Ind.
55; Cumberland, etc., Co. v. Baab, 9 Watts [Pa.], 458), provided such agreements do not overlook paramount public interests. First National Bank, etc., v. Hendrie, 49 Ia. 402.
But if such agreements are to the disadvantage of the public
(Fuller v. Dame, i8 Pick. 472), or if such agreements are
made by members of railroad corporations, as individuals, for
their individual benefit, they are then void as against public
policy. Bestor v. Wathen, 6o Il. 138;.Reed v. Johnson, 27
Wash. 42. The reason is that by such agreements matters of
public interest are controlled by considerations that are merely
personal. A contract of that kind amounts to an official performance by the man who in return receives a personal compensation, and as the office is a public one, it is a bartering
away of public interests as well as a fraud upon the stockholders. The fundamental test as to whether such contracts are
valid, is whether an agreement to perform an act by a public
service corporation is supported by a consideration beneficial to
the public.
In the case. of National Surety Co. v. Foster Lumber Co.,
85 N. E. Rep. 489 (Ind.), the trustees of a public school enThird Party

tered into an agreement with a contractor for the

erection of a building. By the terms of the agreement, the contractor was to pay for all labor and
material furnished. The defendant company became surety
on a bond for the proper performance by the contractor of the

Bnfcry
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agreement. The plaintiffs, having furnished material and not
being paid by the contractor, sued the defendant company on
the bond.
The Court held that "the intention is determinable from the
terms of the contract and an agreement between two parties,
whereby one of them undertakes to pay money to a third, is for
the benefit of the third party and enforceable by him."
Further than the above statement no light is thrown by the
Court upon the reason for the judgment. The jurisdictions
which follow the law laid down above have gone directly opposite to the common law rule and apparently have given no
reasons for their decisions. In the case of Sample v. Hale, 34
Neb. 220, the Court says, "It is a rule well established in this
court that if one party makes a promise to another for the
benefit of a third, the third party may maintain an action on it."
See also Kaufniann v. Cooper, 46 Neb. 644, and Brown v.
Markland, 53 N. E. Rep. 295.
In the cases of Breen v. Kelly, 47 N. W. Rep. (Minn.) lO67,
and Buffalo Cement Co. v. McNaughton, 40 Hun, 74, it was
held that the material men could not recover upon the bond.

CRIMINAL LAW.
In a trial for murder the evidence showed that deceased had
without provocation knocked defendant down; that defendant
Provoatlon to arose, washed his face, and left deceased's barJustify Homo! room, where the trouble occurred, without answercde.
ing deceased's request "to make friends;" that
defendant, having procured a gun, returned two hours later,
inquired for deceased, and went to a lunch room where deceased was; that defendant walked up to deceased without
making any threats or hostile gestures or using any abusive
language to deceased; that defendant refused deceased's offer
to shake hands and be friends, whereupon deceased cursed
defendant; that deceased having accused defendant of having
a knife, defendant opened his hand and showed him that he
had none; that deceased reached for a syrup pitcher and defendant for his revolver, that deceased struck defendant
on the head with the syrup pitcher and that in the struggle
which ensued defendant shot and killed deceased. The trial
court left the question to the jury to determine whether or not
defendant had provoked deceased and therefore was not entitled
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to the benefit of the doctrine of self-defence. The Supreme
Court overruled the objection that the evidence did not raise the
issue of provocation. Scott v. Short, 46 Southern Rep. 1003
(La.).
This case must probably be regarded as an extension of the
common law in this respect.
If the difficulty is provoked with a felonious intent, all right
of self-defence is forfeited (25 Am. & Eng. Law, p. 270,
sec. 3). In such cases the danger must be immediate and the
defence not exceed the attack (Wh. Crim. Law, sec. IO2).
Former hostile acts or threats or present verbal threats are
not sufficient ground for apprehending danger, where there is
no overt act indicating a present intention to execute the
threats. Clark & Marshall Cr. Law, 2nd Ed., p. 4oo and notes;
Mitchell v. St., 6o Ala. 26.
One against whom threats have been made by another is not
justifiable in assaulting him unless the threatener makes some
attempt to execute his threats (State v. Rider, 9o Mo. 54).
The Court refused to draw a line of demarcation between
those acts which occurred before and which occurred after the
parties came into presence. Since the test in these cases is
whether the acts of defendant would be sufficient provocation to
deceased as a reasonable man (Clark and Marshall, supra, p.
398), it is difficult to see how the acts of defendant before he
cam einto deceased's presence and of which deceased did not
and could not know, could affect the adequacy of the provocation.
EVIDENCE.
In the case of Barrett et al. v. Magner, 117 N. E. Rep. 245,
the Sfipreme Court of Minnesota decided that a telephonic conversation is admissible in evidence when, from all
Convertin the circumstances, the identity of the party answering the phone is established with reasonable certainty. Identification by admission of the party or by recognition of the voice is riot essential; it is sufficient if the party
carried on a conversation intelligently upon a matter which
only the person sought to be identified could have done.
This seems to be a reasonable extension of method of identification, as men have long been accustomed to rely upon this
method of identification for business purposes.
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FELLOW-SERVANTS.
The line of a railroad company was divided for the purpose
of operation into blocks, permissive and absolute. The block
between Dingess and Hale was absolute and was
Telegraph
in charge of a telegraph operator. The rules of the
Operator in
company made said operator responsible for the
Blo
operation of trains within his block, and gave
him absolute authority to hold trains until the block was clear.
Rule 527 of defendant under "Instructions to Operators" read:
"Operators * * * will not permit a train to enter a block
following a train in the same direction until the preceding train
has been reported as having cleared the block station ahead,
except by order of the superintendent." The operator in charge
of said block disobeyed order 527, and in the collision which
resulted plaintiff's intestate was killed. Salmons v. Norfolk &
Western R. R., 162 Fed. 722.
The Circuit Court, S. D. W. Va. held, that the operator was
a vice principal and not a fellow-servant of plaintiff's intestate
and that his negligence in this respect was the negligence of the
defendant.
This opinion, in the absence of a Supreme Court decision on
the above facts, must be regarded as law. Care should be
taken, however, not to extend it beyond the facts of the present case. (See Burdick on Torts, p. i6o.)
The following cases in which it has been held that a telegraph
operator is the fellow-servant of trainmen injured by reason
of his negligence in transmitting orders, setting signals, etc.,
may be distinguished on the ground that the operator was there
acting in a purely ministerial capacity in doing the act in which
he was negligent. McKaig v. N. Pac. R. Co., 42 Fed. 288;
Slater v. Jewett, 85 N. Y. 627 (compare Madden v. Ry. Co.,
28 W. Va. 61o, pp. 616-617) ; Cincinnati,N. 0. & T. P. R. Co.
v. Clark, 57 Fed. 125; B. & 0. R. R. Co. v. Camp, 65 Fed.
952; Dana v. N. Y. Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 23 Hun, 473; Monaghan v. N. Y. Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 45 Hun, 113.
The following cases have held the telegraph operator not to
be the fellow-servant of a trainman injured by reason of his
negligence, on the ground that the railroad company is responsible for the reasonably safe operation of its road: Flannegan
v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 40 W. Va. 436; Haney v. P., C.,
C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 38 W. Va. 570; Hall v. Galveston, H. &
S. A. R. Co., 39 Fed. I8; Madden v. C. & 0. R. Co., 28 W. Va.
61o; Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Burtscher, 8 Ohio C. C. (N.
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S.) 137; Frost v. Ore. Short Line & U. N. R. Co., 69 Fed. 936.
East Tennessee, V. & Ga. R. Co. v. De Armond, 86 Tenn. 75,
held likewise on ground that the operator and trainman were in
separate departments.

INSANE PERSONS.
In an action for foreclosure the mortgagor's grantor was
made a party defendant as claiming some interest in the land
covered by the mortgage. Defendant claimed that
his deed was void, as at the time of execution
Cor -,
Me Mortthereof he was of feeble mind.
sag"
Held, that the deed of a person whose mind is
unsound, but not entirely without understanding, made before
his incapacity is judicially determined, is not void but voidable.
And the grantee may mortgage to an innocent third party and
create a valid lien. Maas et al. v. Dunmyer, 96 Pac. 591.
This case, while governed by an Oklahoma statute, is interesting as showing the strong tendency of the Western States to
codify the principles of the common law with which this decision is in accord.
The rule laid down in the early English cases is that a completed contract for the sale of lands made by an insane vendor,
without notice of the vendor's insanity and for a fair consideration, will not be set aside unless the grantee is put in statu
quo (Addison v. Dawson, 2 Vern. 678), and a bona fide purchaser for value from a fraudulent grantee of an insane person
is in exactly the same position as one who purchases direct
from an insane vendor. Odom v. Riddick, io4 N. C. 5i5. This
doctrine is upheld by the great weight of American authoiity,
Blinn v. Schwarz, 177 N. Y. 252 (contra, Galloway v. Hendon,
131 Ala. 28o), though some jurisdictions hold that such conveyance may be avoided without placing the grantee in stati
quo. Gibson v. Soper, 6 Gray, 279; Crawford v. Scovell, 94
Pa. St. 48.
For further cases on this subject see 22 Cyc. 1171, 1176.
Where the guardian of the insane person is considered as
invested with the full legal estate of the ward, all conveyances
made by the ward after adjudication on insanity are of course
void. In re Walker, I9o5 , 1 Ch. i6o.
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LABOR DISPUTES.
The right of the workingman to combine, to strike and to
further his interests by agitation is universally recognized
within certain broad limits. What those limits are
Right
is discussed in Jones v. Van Winkle, 62 S. E. 236,
a typical labor-dispute case, in which striking employees had picketed plaintiff's factory, in order to deter others
from applying for work. The lower court enjoined not only
intimidation, but even argument; but the upper court struck out
the latter restriction, following the trend of authority. The
mass of decisions hold that equity will not enjoin strikers from
persuading others to take their places so long as they do not
resort to violence or commit nuisance. (Gray v. Council, 91
Minn. 171 ; Eddy on Combinations, p. 539.)
A few decisions seem to prohibit even argument, Federal
courts have shown some tendency to stretch equity jurisdiction,
and Knudsen v. Benn, 123 Fed. 636, enjoins persuasion as
well as threat. The language of Thomas v. Cincinnati, 62 Fed.
803, would seem to be in accord, though applying it to the facts
makes it a little less broad. There is also a conflict of authority
as to the effect of motive in civil liability, which may account
for some otherwise irreconcilable decisions. The present case
ignores the idea of motives, and quotes Nat. ProtectiveAssn. v.
Cumning, 17o N. Y. 315, as authority. But at all events the
decision with regard to persuasion is absolutely sound. It is
unquestionably difficult to know just when argument becomes
intimidation, and it is difficult to conceive of a purely philosophical picket, but each case, as the Court says, must depend on
its own facts, and any equitable language infringing on the
much-vaunted right of freedom of speech is unquestionably
too broad.

PENALTIES.
A contract for the sale of real estate provided that, upon the
vendee's failure to execute notes and a mortgage and to make a
second cash payment, the money theretofore paid
Forfe
"isreto be declared forfeited to the said party of the
first part" (vendor). Held, that it was incumbent
on the vendor, upon vendee's default, to declare a forfeiture to
entitle her to retain said money.
"Forfeitures," said the Court, "are not favored either in law
or equity, and if the intent is doubtful, will receive a strict con-
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struction against those for whose benefit they were intended."
Walker v. Burtless, 117 N. W. 39.
Both authority and principle seem to favor this decision.
Since time, as the Court found, was not in the essence of a contract admitted by defendant, a mere failure to pay by the stipulated time would not of itself work a forfeiture (Lincott v.
Buck, 33 Me. 530; Shafer v. Nives, 9 Mich. 253). Notice was
necessary.
Equity interprets contracts so as to save forfeitures if possible, construing the provisions strictly. Here a forfeiture was
to be declared under certain conditions, and as defendant did
not declare a forfeiture at all, she was not entitled to retain the
earnest-money (Murphy v. Maclntyre, 116 N. V. 197; O'Connor v. Hughes, 35 Mann. 334).
The provision for forfeiture is for the benefit of the vendor
and not of the vendee (Sigler v. Wick, 45 Iowa, 69o), and
justice requires that its provisions, in case of doubtful intent,
should be construed strictly against the protected party.

PUBLIC NUISANCE.
Plaintiff brought a bill for injunction to restrain defendant
from obstructing an alleged highway. The defendant denied
the legal existence of the road, and therefore the
at Law
question was one of fact whether or not there was
a nuisance, and whether or not the plaintiff had a
right to maintain the action. Held, in consequence of the conflict of the testimony, as to the existence of the alleged public
nuisance, the suit is dismissed, until the nuisance can be established at law. Van Buskirk v. Bond, 96 Pac. Rep. 1103
(Oregon).
The Court bases its opinion largely on the case of McClain
v. City of Newcastle, 130 Pa. 546, where the plaintiff was
driven *toa trial at law, but it can hardly be said that this fairly
represents the present law of Pennsylvania, for in Sullivan v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 2o8 Pa. 54o, the Court dispenses
with a previous trial at law, in spite of a strong dissenting
opinion by Chief Justice Mitchell. A statute in England, that
of 25 and 26 Vict. C. 42, has long since abolished the necessity
of a previous trial at law, and gives the Chancellor the right to
determine the disputed question himself, or direct an issue to
a jury. Dr. William Draper Lewis, in an article in the Uni-
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versity of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 56, P. 289, has traced
the doctrine of a previous trial at law, showing how, in the case
of nuisance, it was merely the outgrowth of a confusion between trespass on an easement and nuisance, caused by the fact
that each of these wrongs was remedied by an assize of
nuisance. In the case under discussion, the blocking of the way
would technically be a trespass to an easement, and not a
nuisance, hence historically the Court would be justified in
sending the case to law. But it is very much to be doubted
whether, in spite of the weight of authority supporting the rule
at present (see 29 Cyc. 1228), the courts will continue to adhere
to the delay-breeding doctrine, in cases where the Chancellor
feels himself at all qualified to judge of the facts.

SALES.
The defendant in Connecticut ordered some jewelry from
the plaintiffs through the latter's agent; the jewelry was to be
Impobility
imofsibt

shipped f. o. b. Iowa. When the defendant received the jewelry he had it examined and dis-

covered that it was so stamped as to render its
sale in Connecticut unlawful. The defendant returned the
goods to the plaintiffs, who refused to receive them and sued
defendant for purchase price.
Held, that if the goods substantially complied with the defendant's order, the fact that they were unsalable in Connecticut would not rescind the contract and the defendant would
be liable for the purchase price. But if the goods, although in
all other respects they complied with the defendant's order,
were without his authority stamped in such a way as to render
their sale in Connecticut unlawful, the defendant could refuse
within a reasonable time to accept them. Statements in the
printed order that the vendor would buy, replace or exchange
goods did not deprive him of that right. Moline Jewelry Co. Y.
Dinnan, 70 AtI. Rep. 634.

